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The Valuation of European Financial Firms 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We extend the recent literature concerning accounting based valuation models to investigate 
financial firms from six European countries with substantial financial sectors: France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK.  Not only are these crucial industries worthy of study in 
their own right, but unusual accounting practices, and inter-country differences in those accounting 
practices, provide valuable insights into the accounting-value relationship. Our sample consists of 
7,714 financial firm/years observations from 1,140 companies drawn from 1989-2000. Sub-samples 
include 1,309 firm/years for banks, 650 for insurance companies, 1,705 for real estate firms, and 
3,239 for investment companies. In most countries we find that the valuation models work as well or 
better in explaining cross-sectional variations in the market-to-book ratio for financial firms as they 
do for industrial and commercial firms in the same countries, although Switzerland is an exception to 
this generalization. As expected, the results are sensitive to industrial differences, accounting 
regulation and accounting practices. In particular, marking assets to market value reduces the 
relevance of earnings figures and increases that of equity. 
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The Valuation of European Financial Firms 
 
1. Introduction 
We investigate the relationship between accounting variables and valuation for financial 
firms drawn from six European countries with substantial financial sectors: France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK.  Financial firms have largely been ignored in previous studies 
of this type, despite being a substantial part of the market. Indeed, financial firms on average make 
up almost one quarter of the listed firms in the markets examined.  
Furthermore, the accounting practices for financial firms reveal a number of interesting 
developments rarely found elsewhere. In a paper of this length we cannot start to do justice to a 
review of the accounting for financial firms in Europe. It is also unclear whether a review of 
accounting regulations is informative regarding the accounting practices employed as European 
regulations (i) often allow considerable scope and (ii) they are not always followed closely. To 
illustrate, Hoogendoorn (1999) notes that in the Netherlands investment firms can value investments 
at historic cost or market value and ‘recognize all changes, realized and unrealized, in income…(or) 
only realized gains in income, or even to recognize all realized and unrealized changes in market 
value in a separate reserve as part of shareholders’ equity’ (p753). Scheid and Walton (1999) note 
that for France, ‘the existence of (a) regulation does not necessarily mean that companies comply 
with it. Sometimes there are no penalties…, no machinery to police compliance… and tacit 
agreement that some regulations will simply be ignored’ (p304). They also report that in 1992, of 
100 listed firms, 36 used non-French, usually either IASC or US, GAAP for their consolidated 
statements. According to Raffounier (1999) much the same applies to Swiss firms. They claim that 
about 40% of firms use international GAAP for their consolidated group accounts (p1337). So, for 
example, where accounting regulations for the accounts of legal entities expressly forbid the 
revaluation of property, as in Germany or Switzerland, or discourage it, as in France or Italy, holding 
companies may well be able to incorporate revaluations in the consolidated accounts of the group as 
these may be prepared using international or US GAAP. 
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However, our review of these practices suggests that there are two crucial dimensions of 
differences (Alexander and Archer, 1999; Price Waterhouse, 1995). Firstly, there is considerable 
difference in the propensity to revalue investment assets – primarily investment properties and 
financial investments. Thus, in the Netherlands and the UK, it would be normal for these assets to be 
marked to market, whereas in Germany and Switzerland it would be expressly forbidden for 
individual company accounts and consequently rare in consolidated financial statements. Even where 
assets are revalued, the unrealized profits may not be recognized until realized – and in many 
instances not even then. The second characteristic of particular importance is the commitment of the 
accounting procedures to report the economic substance of the year’s transactions. Again the 
Netherlands and the UK, which exhibit a strong shareholder orientation, can be differentiated from 
Germany and Switzerland where the stakeholder approach and the influence of taxation has lead to 
considerable smoothing and suppression of earnings. Raffournier (1999) notes that ‘in Switzerland, 
the creation of hidden reserves is expressly allowed by law’ (p1349) and refers to evidence that 
suggests that ‘reported income represents less than 25% of estimated real earnings’ (p1350). 
Although Seckler (1999) is less blunt about the German accounting system, it is telling that Germany 
has the most developed and formalized system that we are aware of for comprehensively re-stating 
reported earnings to derive earnings estimates that are of value to investors (Harris, Lang and Möller, 
1994). Our understanding is that France is moving from a situation close to that of Germany and 
Switzerland towards that represented by the Netherlands and the UK. For example, Scheid and 
Walton (1999, p290) note that in France ‘the days of profit smoothing, lack of consistency of 
accounting policies and minimal disclosures are largely a thing of the past’. While Italy may also be 
slowly moving in this direction, Zambon (1999, p630) notes that Italian accounting ‘...will probably 
continue to be inspired for a certain period by ... issues of fiscal consequences, conservatism, and 
secrecy’. 
Before going further, it may be useful to illustrate that the impact of the accounting choices 
available is substantial. For 1999, the British property company Land Securities plc, which was 
selected at random for illustrative purposes, reported profits of £216.4m. As these included only 
realized gains that had not previously been accounted for as unrealized gains, historic cost profit 
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would have been £75.1m higher than that reported. Full mark to market accounting would have 
increase profits by £332.9m. The value of property on the balance sheet, at £6,910.3m, included 
£3,286.5m representing the revaluation reserves. The accounting choices facing financial firms in 
Europe are not trivial.  
We firstly estimate a model of market value with earnings and book value of equity as the 
explanatory variables. In this model, the sensitivity of value to both earnings and book value is 
permitted to vary if earnings are negative (Rees, 1999). A second model also differentiates between 
that proportion of earnings distributed as dividends and that retained. Following Rees (1997) and 
Fama and French (1998), this is interpreted as a partitioning of earnings into relatively permanent 
and relatively transitory components. The models are deflated by book value to mitigate 
heteroscedasticity.  
We find that the models explanatory power for our sample of financial firms is generally 
higher than that of similar models estimated using industrial and commercial firms (e.g. García-
Borbolla, Larrán and Rees, 2001). The clearest, and perhaps unsurprising, exception concerns the 
Swiss sample where the earnings based model has negligible explanatory power, despite quite 
typical performance of similar models on non-financial Swiss firms (García-Borbolla et al., 2001). 
We also find significant differences in the estimated models across countries and industries. 
Clear and extreme examples are Italian insurance firms where the estimated equity and earnings 
multiples are 0.118 and 22.155 respectively (37.9% explanatory power) and the Dutch real estate 
sample where the equivalents are 0.961 and 0.194 (76.0% explanatory power). These results are to 
be expected where Italian insurance firms report very conservative earnings, whereas Dutch real 
estate firms are assiduous in marking their balance sheet assets to market. 
Section 2 briefly reviews previous papers that have touched on the valuation of financial 
companies. The research methods adopted are explained in section 3, while the data is described in 
section 4.  The results follow in section 5, while the conclusions are contained in section 6. 
 
2. Prior Research 
Prior studies on the relationship between accounting variables and firm valuation have 
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tended to exclude non-industrial firms.  The reasons for excluding financial firms, property 
companies or investment trusts are not always clearly stated, although Rees (1997, p. 1123) argue 
that ’This restriction is conventional as the relationship between value and accounting numbers is 
thought to be very different for financial firms as opposed to those included in the sample’. Thus 
there is limited prior evidence as to whether Ohlson-type valuation models are effective in 
explaining the cross-sectional variation in the market-to-book ratio (and produce coefficients which 
are not inconsistent with theoretical predictions) for financial firms (Ohlson, 1995). 
However, Barth, Beaver and Wolfson (1990) examined models of the level and change in 
US banks valuation over the period from 1969-1987, splitting earnings into earning before securities 
transaction gains or losses and the securities trading gains and losses (STGL) themselves.  They 
reported that the slope coefficient on earnings was positive and significant and that the coefficient on 
STGL fluctuated and was insignificantly different from zero. After 1973 the slope coefficient on 
earnings was approximately 5 (it was considerably higher before then) and the explanatory power 
averaged 48 percent. 
In a complimentary study, Warfield and Linsmeier (1992) examined the market reaction to 
the disclosure of STGL elements of quarterly accounts. In their analysis of 143 results of US firms 
published during 1980-1985, they found that market reactions were related to the expected effect on 
taxes in the first three quarters of the year, but not in the fourth. Their rationalization of the fourth 
quarter results was consistent with Barth, Beaver and Landsmand’s (1992) explanation that earnings 
management effects contaminate the value relevant information in STGL. 
Barth, Landsman and Walhen (1995) extended the results from Barth et al. (1990) by 
including measures of the volatility of earnings per share measured using historic cost and 
alternatively using fair value accounting for investment securities. The 1,377 cases for US banks 
were drawn from the years 1976-1990. They found that, using undeflated per share regressions, the 
fair value calculation of volatility was dominated by the historic cost version. They also segment 
income into pre-interest income and interest itself and in general interest income was more highly 
valued than other income, and in a way that was consistent with interest rates. 
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Vincent (1999) analyzed the relationship between accounting variables and share returns for 
a sample of 138 US real estate investment trusts over the period 1994-1996. Earnings per share, 
funds from operations, cash from operations and earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization were all value relevant, although ‘Only EPS provides evidence of greater relative 
information content’ (p100). 
Gordon and Vincent (2000) analyzed the valuation of property companies in Hong Kong, 
UK and US during 1994-1997.  They concluded ‘that property companies ... are valued similarly 
despite differences in accounting practices and required financial disclosures’ (p25).  However, 
while the level of share prices were significantly related to both net income and book value on a 
univariate basis in all three countries, net income was no longer significant for the UK if book value 
was simultaneously included in the regression.  Thus, ‘book value is valuation sufficient for UK 
property companies’ (p24).  On the other hand, they found net income to be valuation sufficient for 
Hong Kong property firms.  These differences were somewhat surprising, given that investment 
property assets are revalued annually in both Hong Kong and the UK. 
Thus, prior research indicates that reported accounting earnings are value relevant for banks 
and real estate companies, at least in the Hong Kong, UK and US.  In this study, we extend the 
analysis to six European countries with substantial financial sectors, and to other categories of 
financial firms.  While Gordon and Vincent (2000) found investors to value companies consistently 
across jurisdictions, other studies have shown significant differences between countries in the value 
relevance of accounting numbers – albeit for industrial and commercial firms.  Bartov, Goldberg and 
Kim (2001) reported that earnings were superior to cash flows in explaining share returns in the US, 
UK and Canada (where financial reporting is driven by investor requirements and unencumbered by 
tax requirements), while the reverse was the case for Japan and Germany.  In addition, the 
explanatory power of both earnings and cash flows were substantially lower in Japan and Germany 
than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Similarly, in an analysis of industrial companies in 21 countries 
during 1991-1997, Hung (2001) found accrual accounting (as compared to cash accounting) had a 
negative impact on the value relevance of accounting measures in countries with weak investor 
protection, but not in countries with strong protection of shareholder rights.  Alford, Jones, Leftwich 
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and Zmijewski (1993) and Ali and Hwang (2000) also found the value relevance of accounting 
numbers to vary significantly between financial systems. In particular, value relevance was found to 
be lower in: (i) bank oriented than in market oriented economies, (ii) in markets where governments 
rather than private sector bodies were involved in setting accounting standards, (iii) for Continental 
model than for British-American model countries, and (iv) in countries where tax rules significantly 
influence financial accounting measurements. The comprehensiveness of accounting standards vary 
significantly between countries (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), and 
dividend payout ratios tend to be higher in common than in civil law countries and in countries with 
high as compared to low investor protection (La Porta et al., 1997, 2000).  This may have an impact 
on the value relevance of accounting numbers, in particular on the incremental explanatory power on 
dividends. Indeed, La Porta et al. (2000, p27) argued that ‘...dividend policies of firms may convey 
information to some investors’. 
Our analysis is based on six European countries, with substantial heterogeneity with regard 
to their accounting and legal systems, as summarized in Table 1. These differences, as well as prior 
empirical evidence based on non-financial firms, suggest that the valuation models we estimate may 
vary across regimes. 
Table 1 about here 
 
3. Research Methods 
Our analysis is based on the following model (Rees, 1999): 
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where prt is the price per share at time t, nit is clean surplus net income, eqt  is  book value of 
equity and r and g are the expected constant values (expectations denoted ^) for the cost of capital 
and the growth rate of book value and earnings. w indicates the relative weight (between one and 
zero) placed on current earnings, as opposed to current equity, as indicators of normal base level 
earnings from which growth in earnings is predicted. The firm subscripts are understood. The model 
is based on the well-known transformation of the dividend discount model to an accounting based 
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valuation model (e.g., Ohlson, 1995)1. As an illustrative computation of the coefficients that could be 
expected from the empirical analysis, let us assume a 12% cost of capital and a growth rate of 5%.  If 
w is one, the coefficient on equity would be -0.71 and on net income would be +15. However, were 
w to be 0.5 then the equity coefficient would be +0.14 and the net income coefficient +7.5. Results 
from previous studies, all based on non-financial firms, including Collins, Maydew and Weiss 
(1997) for the US, Harris et al. (1994) for Germany, Joos and Lang (1994) for Germany, France and 
the UK and Rees (1997) for the UK, imply the w is somewhat less than one. In all cases the 
coefficient on net income is less than +15 implied above and the coefficient on equity is positive, as 
is the intercept term. 
The hypotheses are tested using the following model: 
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it +
eq
dv+
eq
niD +D+
eq
ni+
eq
eq
=
eq
pr εααααα ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
43210
.
   (2) 
where Dit is a dummy variable taking the value 1 where net income is negative, D.niit an 
interactive term between net income and the negative earnings dummy variable2, and dvit is the 
ordinary dividends for firm i and year t. The model is initially estimated with α4 set to zero3.  The 
rational is as follows: α0 and α1 estimate the coefficients reflecting growth, cost of capital and the 
weighting parameter, ω, for cases where earnings are positive; and the dummy variable and 
interaction terms allow the weighting parameter to vary for cases that have negative earnings. The 
assumption is that earnings will have approximately a zero weight (α1≈-α3) when negative, and the 
weight on equity will increase correspondingly. The inclusion of the dividend variable can be 
justified on the basis of previous empirical evidence (Rees 1997, Fama and French 1998), but also 
has theoretical underpinning. If we view distributed earnings as being relatively permanent and 
undistributed earnings as relatively transitory, then the inclusion of the dividend variable allows the 
model to differentiate between the weight on permanent and transitory earnings. 
The ability of reported earnings to explain cross-sectional variations in share prices can be 
expected to vary significantly across our sample of European financial firms. We expect earnings to 
have greatest value relevance in the shareholder oriented regimes – the Netherlands and the UK, and 
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we expect it to have least relevance in the stakeholder regimes, most notably Germany and 
Switzerland, where earnings is subject to smoothing and hidden reserves. In those industries where 
the revaluation of investment assets is common, such as real estate and investment, we anticipate 
greater relevance for equity and less for earnings. This is not only because the computation of 
earnings in such cases can be idiosyncratic, but also because earnings derived from investing in 
assets traded in efficient markets should have low permanence in comparison to earnings from 
service industries such as banking and insurance. Finally, we expect to improve our estimation of the 
influence of earnings by the partition of earnings into retained and distributed portions, and this 
improvement should be more noticeable where earnings was ineffectual prior to the partitioning. 
 
4. Data 
An initial sample of 14,057 firm/years for financial companies throughout Europe was 
obtained from the Company Analysis database.  However, a more refined analysis of industrial 
classifications based on SIC codes, indicated that 1,374 of these firm/years were not definitively 
financial firms.  Missing data further reduced the sample to 9,700 cases4.  Eliminating countries 
without at least 400 firm/year observations5, and trimming outliers6, further reduced the sample to 
7,714 financial firm/year observations from a total of 1,140 different companies.  Six countries have 
sufficiently large financial sectors to be included in the analysis: France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK.  In addition to the analysis based on all financial firms, we 
also analyze those financial industry sub-groups where country specific samples of more than 100 
firm/years were available.  A full breakdown of the sample composition is contained in Table 2. 
Table 2 about here 
The analysis incorporates the following variables: 
prit/eqit Market-to-Book Ratio, where prit refers to firm i's price per share for ordinary equity at 
the accounting year end t7, and eqit to firm i's book value of equity per share at year end 
t defined as all equity reserves, and ordinary share capital, but excluding non-ordinary 
equity such as preference shares, 
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niit/eqit Net Income to Book Equity, where niit refers to firm i's earnings per share for year t 
defined as earned for ordinary after interest charges, extraordinary items and taxation, 
Dit Negative Net Income Dummy, taking the value 1 where niit/eqit is negative, 
D.niit/eqit Negative Net Income Interaction.  This is an interactive term, combining the negative 
net income dummy variable with the net income variable, and 
dvit/eqit Ordinary Dividends to Book Equity, where dvit refers to firm i's ordinary dividends per 
share for year t. 
Descriptive statistics for the test variables are presented in Table 3. A brief review shows 
that mean (median) market to book varies from 3.240 (2.219) for Germany to 1.170 (0.959) and 
1.195 (0.864) for France and the UK. Certainly the apparent balance sheet conservatism in Germany 
and optimism in the UK is consistent with expectations and previous evidence about conservative 
accounting in Europe, although it is surprising to see France in a similar position to the UK (Joos and 
Lang, 1994). However, the income statement conservatism, indicated by the price-to-earnings ratio, 
is most apparent in Germany where mean P/E is 41.22, followed by Italy (P/E 32.13), France (P/E 
24.02) and the UK (P/E 22.08), whereas Switzerland (P/E 16.93) and the Netherlands (P/E 15.78) 
report the lowest mean price-to-earnings ratios8. Previous studies of industrial and commercial firms 
have usually indicated that the UK is expected to be one of the least conservative regimes (Joos and 
Lang, 1994). Further investigation reveals that this aberration is largely driven by the UK investment 
companies (P/E 33.46) and to a lesser extent by the real estate firms (P/E 21.05). In the UK, only a 
portion of conventional historic cost profit is passed through the income statement when marking to 
market is used for investment assets.  
Table 3 about here 
The mean of the negative income dummy reveals the incidence of negative earnings in each 
country. France, Italy and the UK all have negative income in more than 10% of the cases, whereas 
at the other extreme German firms report negative income less than 5% of the time – despite having 
the lowest mean earnings when standardized by price. This is consistent with prior evidence that 
German firms tend to smooth earnings whereas French and especially British firms are eager to 
incorporate bad news into transient losses (Giner and Rees, 2001).  
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Finally, the mean dividend yield can be calculated and this is broadly consistent with 
expectations. France, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent the UK, pay out high yields and, at the 
other end of the spectrum, German firms pay the lowest. Again the many real estate and investment 
firms in the British sample reduce the average dividend yield. 
 
5. Results 
Table 4 contains the results of the model estimated pooled across all firms in each country9. 
These should be viewed with some caution as the sample for each country is made up from different 
industries with very different accounting practices and economic circumstances. However, much the 
same can be said for the many valuation models applied to industrial and commercial samples, and 
the results included in table 4 do allow us to conclude on the general applicability of the valuation 
model, the relative importance of equity and income, and the influence of dividends in the model. 
The most startling result is the comparative failure of the first model using the Swiss sample, which 
has only trivial explanatory power. Estimates from a similar model using a sample of industrial and 
commercial firms drawn from a comparable time period revealed quite normal performance for the 
Swiss sample with an R2 of 25.1% (García-Borbolla et al., 2001). It does seem that the reported 
income of Swiss financial firms is particularly irrelevant to value. In the other cases the models have 
explanatory power ranging from 13.9% (France) to 58.4% (the UK). In three instances (Germany, 
Italy and the UK) the explanatory power is significantly greater than for industrial and commercial 
firms, whilst for two (France and the Netherlands) there is a noticeable decline. (García-Borbolla et 
al., 2001). The explanatory power is broadly consistent with our predictions, although the countries 
expected to be intermediate, France and Italy, fare somewhat worse in the first case, and better in the 
second, than expected. This is partly explained by difference in industrial composition of the 
samples, which are discussed later. Even so, the Netherlands and the UK are in the top three by 
explanatory power and Germany and Switzerland are in the bottom three – as expected. 
Table 4 about here 
The estimated coefficients are normally within the broad range expected. The results for 
France are typical. The equity coefficient is 0.7316, between 0 and 1 is normal, and the earnings 
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coefficient is 5.4885, and for this variable between 4 and 10 is quite usual. The negative income 
dummy is positive (0.0729), but insignificantly different from zero, and the interaction term is 
approximately equal but opposite to the income coefficient (-6.0410). This is entirely consistent with 
the underlying model where we assume that equity takes some weight in predicting earnings (ω < 1), 
negative earnings are more or less irrelevant, so that when earnings are negative equity takes greater 
weight (ω ≈ 0).  
The results for three countries fail to fit with this template. The clearest case is Switzerland 
where earnings have virtually no explanatory power but the coefficient for equity is 1.2903. Book to 
market and price to earnings ratios for Switzerland are not abnormal, so it must be assumed that the 
high equity coefficient is due to the poor value relevance of earnings – i.e. ω ≈ 0 whether earnings 
are positive or negative. The opposite seems to be demonstrated by the Italian results where the 
earnings coefficient is considerably higher than normal (16.4480) and the equity coefficient is lower 
(0.2241). This is consistent with high permanence of earnings (ω close to 1) and with ω ≈ 0 when 
earnings are negative. It is pertinent that for Italy the high earnings coefficient is exacerbated by the 
low reported earnings figure – the price to earnings ratio is the second highest after Germany. 
Finally, the German case stands out. Here the equity coefficient is substantially greater than one 
(1.8393), but this does not appear to be simply because ω is significantly less than one as the 
earnings coefficient is, at 15.9930, the second highest after Italy. The explanation here would seem 
to be down to the innate conservatism of German accounting numbers. Mean market to book for the 
German sample is over twice that of any other country in our sample and price to earnings is 
approximately twice the average for other countries (except for Italy which reports 32.13). Thus we 
would seem to have high coefficients on the German independent variables because we have low 
values for the independent variables. 
In each case the country model is replicated with the addition of a dividends variable. As 
discussed earlier, we follow Rees (1997) and Fama and French (1998) as viewing this as an indicator 
of permanent earnings. As would be expected, the value of undistributed (less permanent) earnings 
decline in comparison with the estimate from the previous equation where distributed and 
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undistributed earnings are not differentiated. As the predictive power of earnings is improved, the 
coefficient on equity declines, and the explanatory power of the model increases – substantially so 
for the French, Dutch, Swiss and British samples. 
In tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 we report the model results for industry sub-samples where the sample 
of firm/years is more than 100 cases. Caution should be exercised when interpreting these results, as 
these are small samples that have been pooled over cross-sections and time-series. In the interest of 
brevity only those cases that add to the insights from table 4 are commented on.  
In table 4 the results for the banking industry are presented. These are broadly similar to 
those of table 3, suggesting that inter-country differences in table 4 are not caused by industrial 
differences. These similarities include low equity and high income coefficients in Italy, trivial 
explanatory power for income in Switzerland and high explanatory power of the model in the UK. 
However, for the banking industry, the UK sample has higher income and lower equity coefficients 
than for the full UK sample – suggesting that ω is closer to 1 for UK banks than for the other firms. 
Perhaps the clearest difference between the table 4 and table 5 results is for Germany, where the high 
equity and earnings coefficients of table 4 are not repeated. It is worth noting that dividends are 
relatively unimportant for the German sample. This is repeated in the following table for the German 
insurance companies. In both cases negative earnings are rare. It is negative earnings that seem to 
particularly damage the value relevance of earnings and where dividends are particularly helpful. 
Table 5 about here 
The results for insurance firms, reported in table 6, are again largely similar to earlier results. 
Earnings are important in Italy, insignificant and marginally negative in Switzerland and, as for 
banks, the British results have higher earnings and lower equity coefficients than does the British full 
sample. A more abrupt change is the high coefficient on the equity for German firms that will, in 
part, explain the high equity on the full German sample. 
Table 6 about here 
The results for the real estate sector, presented in table 7, show some substantial differences 
from the full sample results in table 4. It is here that we first come upon the high earnings and equity 
coefficients for the German sample, which, we have argued, must be consistent with extreme 
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conservatism. The Dutch sample results are curious. The equity coefficient is now close to one and 
earnings are insignificant – and this would be entirely consistent with marking to market. However, 
we are unable to explain the high coefficient on negative earnings and the perverse and significant 
coefficient on the negative income dummy. We suspect that the revaluation of assets has so 
successfully modeled value that there is no residual use for earnings. The British result is much akin 
to the full sample results, but the equity coefficients are higher and the earnings coefficients lower 
than those revealed for banks and insurance companies. This was expected where marking to market 
is common, and where the earnings figure has little to do with either economic or historic cost 
accounting profit. However, we had expected the move to equity based valuation to be more abrupt – 
especially given the prior evidence from Gordon and Vincent (2000). 
Table 7 about here 
The final set of results concern the investment companies. For the Netherlands and the UK, 
marking to market is common. Hence we would expect high values on the equity coefficient, low 
values on the earnings and high explanatory power. We find that the value of the earnings for France 
is abnormally low, the equity coefficient for the Netherlands is close to one, and the dividend 
coefficient is extremely high, and that the explanatory power of the UK model is high. These are 
consistent with expectations. Again we were surprised that equity was not more clearly dominant for 
the UK sample. However, in this instance we were able to further sub-divide the sample into (i) 
investment companies as classified by the Financial Times and (ii) other investment firms which 
tended to be investment advisers. In the first case we find that the equity variable is very influential 
and closer to one and that the earnings variable is insignificant. In this instance not only are earnings 
insignificant but dividends, which we use to augment the earnings estimate, are also insignificant. It 
would appear that for these firms, as for the Dutch real estate sample, equity works well, and there is 
no room for earnings – even when supported by dividends. 
Table 8 about here 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have investigated the relationship between accounting variables and the valuation of 
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7,714 cases for financial firms from six European countries with substantial financial sectors: France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK.  Our sample of firms is segmented 
between banks, insurance companies, real estate firms, and investment companies. The first result – 
that accounting based models of market to book work relatively well for financial firms – is 
somewhat surprising as researchers have avoided applying Ohlson style valuation models to 
financial firms. The exceptions are the few papers that have shown that valuation models work for 
banks and real estate companies in the US, the UK and Hong Kong, but we are not aware of papers 
that have extended the approach further. We also found that the value relevance of earnings was high 
in the traditional shareholder regimes – the Netherlands and the UK, but we were surprised to find 
that the Italian sample also exhibited such high explanatory power. 
We have also found that for those firms which value their balance sheet assets at market 
prices (which is more prevalent in the shareholder than in the stakeholder oriented economies) – not 
surprisingly – the equity element of the model is considerably more influential than the income 
element. This is particularly true of the real estate firms – except for the German sample where 
revaluation is relatively rare. For investment companies, earnings remains important, but where 
investment companies were carefully defined to exclude investment advisers, the equity coefficient 
is close to one and the earnings are of little significance. Perhaps this is unsurprising as in an 
efficient market returns in one period are unlikely to have much information content for returns in 
following periods and, as for real estate firms, the income measures for investment companies are 
based on curious accounting practices. 
Finally, we had expected that dividends would be an effective surrogate for earnings, 
especially where the earnings appeared to be ineffective. There is some evidence that this is the case 
and the Swiss results are the clearest example. However, in two instances both earnings and 
dividends are insignificant. These are the Dutch real estate sample and the British, narrowly defined, 
investment firms sample. In both cases the equity coefficient is close to one. Our interpretation is 
that earnings have no role to play: not that it is ineffectually measured. Where assets are accurately 
marked to market, and where earnings are derived from trading in an efficient market, it is not clear 
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that abnormal earnings can be predicted on the basis of past earnings. In which case earnings should 
be, and are, irrelevant for valuation purposes. 
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Table 1. Accounting and Legal Environment 
The table list core differences in the accounting and legal environments in which our sample firms 
operate. Source of GAAP indicate whether the source for the accounting standards was the 
government or whether private sector organizations were also involved; Rating on accounting 
standards examine the inclusion of 90 items in their annual reports; Revaluation indicate whether 
revaluation of property and financial assets are legal or common; Financial-tax realignment indicate 
whether tax rules significantly influence accounting measurements, Law indicates the legal origin of 
the country; and Anti-director right is a measure of shareholder rights over managers (on a scale from 
a low of 0 to a high of 6). Adapted from Alexander and Archer (1999), Alford et al. (1993), Ali and 
Hwang (2000), and La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000). 
 Source of 
GAAP 
Rating of 
Accounting 
Standards 
Revaluation Financial – 
Tax 
Alignment 
Law Anti-
Director 
Rights 
Stakeholder economies:      
Germany Govt only 62 Prohibited High Civil – 
German 
1 
Switzerland Govt only 68 Prohibited High Civil – 
German 
2 
Intermediate economies:      
Italy Govt only 62 Discouraged High Civil – 
French 
1 
France Govt only 69 Discouraged High Civil – 
French 
3 
Shareholder economies:      
Netherlands Govt & 
Private 
64 Common Low Civil – 
French 
2 
UK Govt & 
Private 
78 Common Low Common – 
English 
5 
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Table 2.  Sample Selection 
 Firm/years
Firms classified by Company Analysis as ‘Financial’  14,057
Incorrect industry classification (firm not financial) 1,374 
Control for missing values4: 2,635 
Financial year below 350 or above 380 days 348 
Remove countries with small samples (>400 firm/years) 1,676 
Outlier elimination 310 6,343
Final sample  7,714
  
Sample composition – Financials:  
Country (Companies) Banks Insurance 
Companies
Real 
Estate
Investment 
Companies 
 
Germany  (79) 167 136 195   547
Switzerland  (77) 265 100   573
Italy  (58) 219 126   434
France  (185) 345 103 400 275  1,203
Netherlands  (56) 109 199  451
UK   (685)   313 185 1,001 2,765  4,506
Total      (1,140) 1309 650 1,705 3,239  7,714
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
The table contains descriptive statistics for the full sample of financial firm/years for each country in 
the analysis. pr/eq refers to the market to book ratio, ni/eq to the net income scaled by book equity, D 
to a negative net income dummy variable, D.ni/eq to the interactive term between this dummy 
variable and net income scaled by book equity, and dv/eq to the dividend scaled by book equity. 
 Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Q1 Q3
Stakeholder economies:  
Germany (547)  
pr/eq 3.2400 2.2190 2.7660 0.5940 16.3440 1.4000 4.2310
ni/eq 0.0786 0.0698 0.0853 -0.4387 0.4286 0.0364 0.1101
D 0.0475 0.0000 0.2130 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
D.ni/eq -0.0053 0.0000 0.0326 -0.4387 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dv/eq 0.0444 0.0333 0.0475 0.0000 0.3340 0.0127 0.0554
Switzerland (573)  
pr/eq 1.3525 1.1758 0.8527 0.0716 7.3299 0.8826 1.6673
ni/eq 0.0799 0.0671 0.1360 -0.8233 0.8896 0.0409 0.1033
D 0.0855 0.0000 0.2799 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
D.ni/eq -0.0128 0.0000 0.0643 -0.8232 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dv/eq 0.0302 0.0338 0.0244 0.0000 0.1356 0.0049 0.0461
Intermediate economies:  
Italy (434)  
pr/eq 1.4493 1.0939 1.1897 0.0640 8.0643 0.7568 1.6813
ni/eq 0.0451 0.0681 0.1162 -0.7210 0.2139 0.0390 0.0982
D 0.1152 0.0000 0.3196 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
D.ni/eq -0.0243 0.0000 0.0892 -0.7210 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dv/eq 0.0300 0.0287 0.0230 0.0000 0.1286 0.0143 0.0417
France (1,203)  
pr/eq 1.1698 0.9590 0.7919 0.0718 7.4066 0.6897 1.4285
ni/eq 0.0487 0.0696 0.1510 -1.5427 0.3287 0.0323 0.1094
D 0.1288 0.0000 0.3352 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
D.ni/eq -0.0268 0.0000 0.1241 -1.5427 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dv/eq 0.0375 0.0262 0.0393 0.0000 0.2098 0.0088 0.0512
Shareholder economies:  
Netherlands (451)  
pr/eq 1.4768 1.0286 1.5064 0.2823 10.9587 0.9000 1.2890
ni/eq 0.0936 0.0729 0.1713 -0.7083 1.3724 0.0319 0.1163
D 0.0687 0.0000 0.2533 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
D.ni/eq -0.0126 0.0000 0.0719 -0.7083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dv/eq 0.0489 0.0387 0.0671 0.0000 0.7195 0.0079 0.0655
UK (4,506)  
pr/eq 1.1947 0.8640 1.1799 0.2188 10.4310 0.7631 1.0161
ni/eq 0.0541 0.0289 0.1098 -0.7106 0.6921 0.0107 0.0607
D 0.1119 0.0000 0.3152 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000
D.ni/eq -0.0078 0.0000 0.0473 -0.7106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
dv/eq 0.0333 0.0205 0.0474 0.0000 0.4048 0.0078 0.0365
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Table 4.  Regression Analysis by Country – Financial Firms 
The table contains output from OLS regressions of the market to book ratio (pr/eq) on book equity 
scaled by book equity (eq/eq), net income scaled by book equity (ni/eq), a negative net income 
dummy variable (D), the interactive term between this dummy variable and net income scaled by book 
equity (D.ni/eq), and dividends scaled by book equity (dv/eq). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics 
(White, 1980) are reported in brackets. 
Country 
(Obs.) 
eq/eq ni/eq D D.ni/eq dv/eq Adj R2 
(P-value) 
Stakeholder economies:     
Germany 
(547) 
1.8393 
(8.38) 
 
15.9930 
(6.63) 
1.0414 
(1.34) 
-17.7990 
(-3.57) 
 16.2% 
(0.000)
 1.7449 
(8.09) 
 
12.2330 
(4.31) 
1.1257 
(1.45) 
-14.0630 
(-2.70) 
9.1330 
(2.47) 
17.5% 
(0.000)
Switzerland 
(573) 
1.2903 
(23.75) 
 
0.7960 
(1.50) 
-0.0890 
(-0.76) 
-0.4870 
(-0.70) 
 1.0% 
(0.034)
 0.6848 
(10.44) 
 
0.9213 
(2.34) 
0.3472 
(3.02) 
-0.8143 
(-1.34) 
18.3460 
(10.14) 
26.3% 
(0.000)
Intermediate economies:     
Italy 
(434) 
0.2241 
(1.61) 
 
16.4480 
(8.05) 
0.7005 
(3.64) 
-16.5750 
(-7.84) 
 31.0% 
(0.000)
 0.1700 
(1.21) 
 
13.5560 
(5.96) 
0.7381 
(3.91) 
-13.7260 
(-5.89) 
8.3060 
(2.09) 
32.0% 
(0.000)
France 
(1,203) 
0.7316 
(13.12) 
 
5.4885 
(7.97) 
0.0729 
(0.88) 
-6.0410 
(-8.21) 
 13.9% 
(0.000)
 0.6481 
(12.54) 
 
2.2431 
(3.49) 
0.1008 
(1.26) 
-3.1041 
(-4.12) 
8.1196 
(9.94) 
24.9% 
(0.000)
Shareholder economies:     
Netherlands 
(451) 
0.8978 
(12.80) 
 
5.0852 
(7.31) 
-0.0598 
(-0.22) 
-8.5530 
(-3.45) 
 24.7% 
(0.000)
 0.7554 
(6.04) 
 
1.6339 
(1.45) 
0.0514 
(0.18) 
-5.1710 
(-1.98) 
10.2330 
(2.05) 
33.7% 
(0.000)
UK 
(4,506) 
0.5362 
(35.20) 
 
9.8072 
(29.83) 
0.3668 
(10.90) 
-11.1255 
(-18.53) 
 58.4% 
(0.000)
 0.4290 
(27.23) 
 
5.2440 
(11.51) 
0.4071 
(13.58) 
-5.9272 
(-9.19) 
11.7104 
(12.83) 
67.2% 
(0.000)
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Table 5.  Regression Analysis by Country and Industry – Banks 
The table contains output from OLS regressions of the market to book ratio (pr/eq) on book equity 
scaled by book equity (eq/eq), net income scaled by book equity (ni/eq), a negative net income 
dummy variable (D), the interactive term between this dummy variable and net income scaled by 
book equity (D.ni/eq), and dividends scaled by book equity (dv/eq).  ‘no info’ indicates that the 
negative earnings interaction coefficient could not be estimated as there are insufficient negative 
income cases in this sample. Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics (White, 1980) are reported in 
brackets. 
Country 
(Obs.) 
eq/eq ni/eq D D.ni/eq dv/eq Adj R2 
(P-value) 
Stakeholder economies:     
Germany 
(167) 
1.0047 
(11.47) 
 
6.2320 
(4.75) 
-0.0012 
(-0.01) 
no info  9.9% 
(0.000)
 0.9643 
(10.94) 
 
5.2730 
(3.64) 
0.0384 
(0.44) 
no info 2.7240 
(1.42) 
10.2% 
(0.000)
Switzerland 
(265) 
1.1779 
(12.71) 
 
0.9792 
(0.84) 
0.0846 
(0.38) 
-0.8870 
(-0.68) 
 0.1% 
(0.356)
 0.3798 
(3.54) 
 
0.5053 
(0.95) 
0.4295 
(2.38) 
-0.9938 
(-1.09) 
24.2980 
(9.13) 
39.5% 
(0.000)
Intermediate economies:     
Italy 
(219) 
-0.0027 
(-0.02) 
 
17.5100 
(7.11) 
0.6787 
(2.75) 
-17.4190 
(-6.90) 
 49.7% 
(0.000)
 -0.0441 
(-0.27) 
 
13.2030 
(5.43) 
0.7201 
(2.93) 
-13.1120 
(-5.26) 
10.6480 
(2.28) 
51.5% 
(0.000)
France 
(345) 
0.6227 
(8.66) 
 
4.3439 
(4.97) 
-0.0915 
(-0.67) 
-5.3192 
(-5.56) 
 18.1% 
(0.000)
 0.5894 
(9.83) 
 
2.6872 
(3.21) 
-0.0844 
(-0.65) 
-3.6965 
(-4.03) 
8.9870 
(6.40) 
26.0% 
(0.000)
Shareholder economies:     
UK  
(313) 
0.1438 
(0.91) 
 
12.1758 
(10.64) 
0.8196 
(4.27) 
-12.643 
(-10.28) 
 54.2% 
(0.000)
 -0.0147 
(-0.12) 
 
(6.9776 
(4.97) 
0.3434 
(1.82) 
-7.0980 
(-4.17) 
14.9660 
(5.21) 
62.5% 
(0.000)
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Table 6.  Regression Analysis by Country and Industry – Insurance Companies 
The table contains output from OLS regressions of the market to book ratio (pr/eq) on book equity 
scaled by book equity (eq/eq), net income scaled by book equity (ni/eq), a negative net income 
dummy variable (D), the interactive term between this dummy variable and net income scaled by book 
equity (D.ni/eq), and dividends scaled by book equity (dv/eq).  ‘no info’ indicates that the negative 
earnings interaction coefficient could not be estimated as there are insufficient negative income cases 
in this sample. Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics (White, 1980) are reported in brackets. 
Country 
(Obs.) 
eq/eq ni/eq D D.ni/eq dv/eq Adj R2 
(P-value) 
Stakeholder economies:     
Germany 
(136) 
2.5831 
(9.02) 
 
9.4880 
(3.56) 
-0.3580 
(-1.02) 
no info  6.9% 
(0.003)
 2.5789 
(9.06) 
 
7.2970 
(2.14) 
-0.4860 
(-1.30) 
no info 4.8540 
(1.29) 
6.9% 
(0.006)
Switzerland 
(100) 
1.5413 
(13.99) 
 
-0.6835 
(-0.60) 
-0.0897 
(-0.37) 
0.802 
(0.60) 
 0.0% 
(0.910)
 0.4598 
(3.20) 
 
-0.4797 
(-1.28) 
-0.0655 
(-0.13) 
-2.8840 
(-1.66) 
39.6060 
(7.27) 
49.7% 
(0.000)
Intermediate economies:     
Italy 
(126) 
0.1184 
(0.48) 
 
22.1550 
(6.26) 
0.8651 
(2.05) 
-23.8150 
(-6.35) 
 37.9% 
(0.000)
 -0.0099 
(-0.04) 
 
15.5680 
(4.48) 
0.9935 
(2.37) 
-17.2280 
(-4.66) 
22.2170 
(2.47) 
43.2% 
(0.000)
France 
(103) 
0.8951 
(8.37) 
 
4.8780 
(4.02) 
-0.0054 
(-0.03) 
-7.8630 
(-3.65) 
 14.5% 
(0.000)
 0.7227 
(7.14) 
 
3.5050 
(2.65) 
0.1384 
(0.82) 
-6.5590 
(-2.97) 
9.4400 
(3.07) 
22.9% 
(0.000)
Shareholder economies:     
UK 
(185) 
0.2108 
(1.19) 
 
13.3750 
(9.26) 
1.0361 
(4.64) 
-14.6130 
(-8.43) 
 48.0% 
(0.000)
 0.0632 
(0.61) 
 
4.4625 
(4.24) 
0.1161 
(0.71) 
-4.6020 
(-2.94) 
18.6860 
(13.15) 
77.2% 
(0.000)
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Table 7.  Regression Analysis by Country and Industry – Real Estate 
The table contains output from OLS regressions of the market to book ratio (pr/eq) on book equity 
scaled by book equity (eq/eq), net income scaled by book equity (ni/eq), a negative net income 
dummy variable (D), the interactive term between this dummy variable and net income scaled by 
book equity (D.ni/eq), and dividends scaled by book equity (dv/eq). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-
statistics (White, 1980) are reported in brackets. 
Country 
(Obs.) 
Eq/eq ni/eq D D.ni/eq dv/eq Adj R2 
(P-value) 
Stakeholder economies:     
Germany 
(195) 
3.2472 
(9.26) 
 
13.3690 
(4.04) 
0.3860 
(0.34) 
-13.1730 
(-1.59) 
 12.8% 
(0.000)
 3.0742 
(8.89) 
 
7.3880 
(1.95) 
0.5590 
(0.49) 
-7.1920 
(-0.85) 
13.7260 
(2.90) 
16.1% 
(0.000)
Intermediate economies:     
France 
(400) 
0.9458 
(12.72) 
 
5.1739 
(5.31) 
0.0763 
(0.52) 
-5.5880 
(-5.34) 
 9.7% 
(0.000)
 0.7889 
(13.27) 
 
0.9100 
(1.07) 
0.1279 
(0.92) 
-1.4760 
(-1.61) 
7.8080 
(7.27) 
16.5% 
(0.000)
Shareholder economies:     
Netherlands 
(109) 
0.9615 
(19.93) 
 
0.1941 
(0.38) 
-1.3025 
(-2.49) 
-12.3064 
(-8.98) 
 76.0% 
(0.000)
 0.9599 
(26.54) 
 
0.7439 
(1.66) 
-1.3009 
(-2.49) 
-12.8560 
(-9.55) 
0.9200 
(1.82) 
76.1% 
(0.000)
UK 
(1,001) 
0.5355 
(13.08) 
 
5.8934 
(8.31) 
0.4257 
(4.10) 
-5.5012 
(-6.63) 
 34.4% 
(0.000)
 0.4056 
(9.06) 
 
2.9398 
(4.11) 
0.4030 
(4.16) 
-2.8275 
(-3.52) 
11.9975 
(4.70) 
50.2% 
(0.000)
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Table 8.  Regression Analysis by Country and Industry – Investment Companies 
The table contains output from OLS regressions of the market to book ratio (pr/eq) on book equity 
scaled by book equity (eq/eq), net income scaled by book equity (ni/eq), a negative net income dummy 
variable (D), the interactive term between this dummy variable and net income scaled by book equity 
(D.ni/eq), and dividends scaled by book equity (dv/eq).  ICs refers to investment companies as 
classified by the Financial Times, while ‘other’ refers to other investment firms (predominately 
investment advisers). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics (White, 1980) are reported in brackets. 
Country 
(Obs.) 
eq/eq ni/eq D D.ni/eq dv/eq Adj R2 
(P-value) 
Intermediate economies:     
France 
(275) 
0.7849 
(6.68) 
 
2.9896 
(1.83) 
-0.0327 
(-0.25) 
-3.0874 
(-1.89) 
 3.9% 
(0.003)
 0.6779 
(6.11) 
 
-1.3523 
(-1.15) 
0.0108 
(0.09) 
1.1830 
(1.00) 
12.6430 
(4.62) 
23.8% 
(0.000)
Shareholder economies:     
Netherlands 
(199) 
0.9709 
(5.74) 
 
6.9890 
(2.10) 
-0.0280 
(-0.14) 
-8.0700 
(-2.34) 
 13.7% 
(0.000)
 0.3529 
(4.78) 
 
1.4167 
(2.98) 
0.5426 
(4.04) 
-2.6140 
(-2.58) 
31.8630 
(11.70) 
64.3% 
(0.000)
UK 
(2,765) 
0.5839 
(26.93) 
 
10.5223 
(13.58) 
0.3059 
(9.23) 
-12.7928 
(-11.39) 
 58.3% 
(0.000)
 0.5285 
(22.80) 
 
7.6858 
(5.74) 
0.3518 
(10.52) 
-9.7848 
(-6.13) 
6.2119 
(2.92) 
60.2% 
(0.000)
UK – ICs 
(2,544) 
0.8213 
(62.29) 
 
0.3357 
(0.60) 
0.0332 
(1.07) 
-3.7721 
(-2.09) 
 8.2% 
(0.000)
 0.8108 
(111.87) 
 
-0.5758 
(-0.42) 
0.0430 
(1.48) 
-2.9115 
(-1.37) 
1.5630 
(1.30) 
9.06 
(0.000)
UK – other 
(221) 
0.5559 
(4.31) 
 
12.2694 
(11.38) 
0.9700 
(2.31) 
-12.9480 
(-8.89) 
 59.6% 
(0.000)
 0.3632 
(3.12) 
 
5.8150 
(3.47) 
0.5015 
(1.40) 
-7.1710 
(-3.82) 
15.0130 
(5.14) 
67.6% 
(0.000)
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1 The assumptions required to move from value as the present value of expected dividends to 
equation one above are: that expectations of time series of book value, net income and equity 
disbursements or increments (usually designated dividends) are governed by the clean surplus 
relationship - i.e. eqt = eqt-1 + nit + dvt; that both the expectations of the required rate of return and 
the growth rate of book value and net income can be equated to a constant equivalent; that the 
expected growth of book value and net income are the same; and finally that a current base level for 
earnings, from which growth is extrapolated, is a weighting of current net income and current book 
value of equity times the required rate of return. 
 
2 There may be a theoretical argument for also interacting the negative earnings dummy variable 
with the dividend variable (i.e., the dividend response coefficient may vary depending on whether 
the company reports profits or losses).  Analysis including this interactive term was undertaken, 
although none of the coefficients for this variable were statistically significant, and there was 
virtually no impact on the other regression coefficients or on the explanatory power of the models.  
Consequently, results are reported for models excluding this interactive term. 
 
3 An alternative specification of the model would be to adjust ni by deducting dv when dv is included 
in the model, thus separating retained and distributed earnings. However, the chosen specification, 
which follows Fama and French (1998) and Rees (1999), allows for a direct test of the incremental 
value relevance of dividends.  It should be noted that the choice between these two specifications has 
no impact on the other regression coefficients or on the explanatory power of the model.   
 
4 From the sample of 12,683 financial firm/years, 1,995 observations were excluded due to missing 
share price data, 5 due to share price being negative or zero, 18 due to missing book value of 
shareholders equity, 91 due to book value of shareholders equity being negative or zero, 523 due to 
missing ordinary dividend data, 3 due to incorrect dividend data (negative), 156 due to financial year 
being below 350 days, and 192 due to financial year exceeding 380 days. 
 
5 While this cutoff is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, countries with fewer observations did not have 
sufficient data to allow analysis at the industry level.  The cutoff left us with a sample still exhibiting 
considerable heterogeneity, with two stakeholder, two shareholder, and two intermediate economies. 
 
6 For each country separately, the top and bottom one percent of observations for pr/eq and ni/eq, as 
well as the top one percent of dv/eq variables were deleted.  (Due to too many ties (at zero), it was 
not possible to trim the bottom one percent of dv/eq).  D and D.ni/eq were not trimmed, as these 
variables were derived from ni/eq, which had already been trimmed). As a robustness check, the 
analysis was re-estimated with trimming at the two percent level.  This had no substantive impact on 
the core descriptive statistics, or on the regression coefficients.  Significance levels were generally 
marginally lower due to the smaller sample size, although the conclusions were not altered. The 
analysis has also been undertaken using robust rank regression, which is insensitive to outliers. 
  
7 Prior evidence (e.g., Barth et al., 1992) indicates that the results are not sensitive to the choice 
between year end or disclosure date share prices. 
 
8 For the sake of brevity, the price to earnings ratio and the dividend yield ratios are not reported in 
the descriptive statistics as neither are used in the estimated models. 
 
9 To test the sensitivity of our results to alternative estimation procedures, all regressions were re-
estimated using non-parametric rank regressions, and, where feasible, annual regressions were 
estimated and the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach used to estimate mean coefficients and 
confidence intervals. Where robust regressions indicated that either the sign or the statistical 
significance of the pooled OLS results was unreliable, the regression coefficient is reported in italics. 
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